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EMBRACING RACE-CONSCIOUS COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS: HOW FISHER V. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
REDEFINES “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” AS A 
HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADMISSIONS 
THAT ENSURES EQUAL, NOT 
PREFERENTIAL, TREATMENT 
BY NANCY L. ZISK*
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed well-established Supreme Court doctrine that race may be con-
sidered when a college or university decides whom to admit and whom to reject, 
as long as the consideration of race is part of a narrowly tailored holistic con-
sideration of an applicant’s many distinguishing features. The Court’s latest 
decision heralds a new way of thinking about holistic race-conscious admissions 
programs.  Rather than considering them as “affirmative action” plans that 
prefer any one applicant to the disadvantage of another, they should be viewed 
as the Court has described them, as holistic plans that are “flexible enough to 
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifica-
tions of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for considera-
tion,” consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Applying the “searching examination” that the Court defined and 
required in its first consideration of the case, the Court in its second review 
again confirmed that universities may include race in a holistic consideration 
of each applicant’s potential to contribute to their university communities. De-
spite appearing to limit the reach of the decision by describing the case as “sui 
generis” litigated in such a way as to “limit its value for prospective guidance,” 
the Fisher decision affirms what the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1978 and 
established in 2003 that race may be considered as part of a narrowly tailored 
holistic consideration of the characteristics and traits of each applicant.  
Properly understood as treating the traits of all applicants “on the same foot-
ing,” race-conscious plans should be embraced, not limited, because they are 
consistent with the Court’s now settled law and may be broadly used to achieve 
the well-established interest of student body diversity in this country’s colleges 
and universities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided, once 
again, that race may be considered when a college or university decides 
whom to admit and whom to reject, as long as the consideration of race 
is part of a narrowly tailored holistic consideration of an applicant’s 
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many distinguishing features.1  This decision, building on well-estab-
lished Supreme Court doctrine,2 heralds a new way of thinking about 
holistic race-conscious admissions programs.  Rather than considering 
them as “affirmative action” plans that prefer any one applicant to the 
disadvantage of another, they should be viewed as the Court has de-
scribed them, as holistic plans that are “flexible enough to consider all 
pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of 
each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for considera-
tion,” consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.3
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Abigail Fisher, a white fe-
male applicant who was rejected by the University of Texas at Austin, 
challenged the University’s race-conscious admissions program.  In its 
first consideration of the case, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision to uphold the University’s program and remanded the 
case, instructing the Court of Appeals to review the program with the 
demanding “strict scrutiny” standard the constitution requires.4  On re-
mand, the Court of Appeals reviewed with “exacting scrutiny” the Uni-
versity’s goal of student body diversity and its means for achieving it,5
and again upheld the University’s race-conscious plan, concluding that 
to do otherwise “is to confound developing principles of neutral affirm-
ative action.”6  The Supreme Court labelled the University’s considera-
tion of race as “affirmative-action” and affirmed the decision of the 
* J.D., Duke University, B.A., Duke University, Professor of Law, Charleston School of 
Law. This article follows this author’s previous article published by the Harvard Journal on 
Racial & Ethnic Justice on the topic of race-conscious admissions programs published after 
the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013). See Nancy L. Zisk, Following the “Pathmarkers” from Bakke to Fisher: Understanding 
How Race-Conscious Admissions Programs May Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny, 30 HARV. J.
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2014). 
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (upholding the race-conscious admis-
sions program used by the University of Michigan Law School); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating the admissions program used by the Medical School 
University of California at Davis that reserved seats for minority applicants but embracing 
holistic consideration of an applicant’s characteristics, including race) (plurality opinion). 
3. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317; accord Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
4. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). 
5. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016).
6. Id. at 660. 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 88 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 88 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
3 ZISK-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 1:53 PM
838 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:835 
Court of Appeals.7
The Court’s labelling of the University’s plan as an “affirmative-ac-
tion” plan is misleading because since 1978, in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, the Court has made clear that race cannot be used to 
“aid” anyone at the expense of another.8  In contrast to the Supreme 
Court’s label, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit referred to the 
University of Texas’ race-conscious plan as “neutral affirmative action,” 
properly recognizing that the University’s race-conscious plan did not 
give preferential treatment to any applicant, but instead ensured indi-
vidualized and equal consideration of each and every applicant.9  In 
Bakke, the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that “the interest of diver-
sity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions pro-
gram,”10 and in 2003, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, reiterated “that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions.”11 Embracing race-conscious ad-
missions programs that promote student body diversity as “central” to 
a university’s “identity and educational mission,” the Court in Fisher II
has again confirmed that universities may include race in a holistic con-
sideration of each applicant’s potential to contribute to their university 
communities, so it may appear that this issue is now settled.12
However, the Fisher II Court appears to limit the reach of the deci-
sion by describing the case as “sui generis”13 litigated in such a way as to 
“limit its value for prospective guidance.”14  Despite the Court’s appar-
ent limitation of its reach, however, the Fisher II decision affirms what 
the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1978 and established in 2003 that 
race may be considered as part of a narrowly tailored holistic consider-
ation of the characteristics and traits of each applicant.  Properly under-
stood as treating the traits of all applicants “on the same footing,”15 race-
7. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).  For clarity 
throughout this article, the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision will be referred to as Fisher II and
its 2013 decision will be referred to as Fisher I.  The district and appellate court decisions will 
be referred to as Fisher and identified by the appropriate court. 
8. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
9. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 646, 660. 
10. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. 
12. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
13. Id. at 2208. 
14. Id. at 2209. 
15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
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conscious plans should be embraced, not limited.  As this article con-
cludes, they are consistent with the Court’s now settled law and may be 
broadly used to achieve the well-established interest of student body 
diversity in this country’s colleges and universities.
Section II examines the Supreme Court’s decisions establishing that 
the goal of achieving diversity in higher education is a compelling in-
terest and that considering race as part of an admissions program is con-
stitutional if the program is narrowly tailored to achieving that goal.  
Section III reviews how the University of Texas satisfied the Court’s 
strict scrutiny of its admissions program, and Section IV argues that the 
use of race-conscious admissions programs should be embraced be-
cause they ensure review of all of the traits and characteristics of each 
applicant for admission and do not aid unqualified or less qualified ap-
plicants at the expense of others.  Section V concludes that universities 
in the future may incorporate race into their admissions programs to 
ensure consideration of all characteristics of all applicants which will, in 
turn, ensure student body diversity, as the Court has now repeatedly 
confirmed they can do. 
II. THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION IS A 
COMPELLING INTEREST AND CONSIDERATION OF RACE AS PART OF A 
UNIVERSITY’S ADMISSIONS PROGRAM IS CONSTITUTIONAL IF THE 
PROGRAM IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVING THAT GOAL.
The Supreme Court, in Fisher II, addressed the question of “whether 
the race-conscious admissions program at the University of Texas is 
lawful under the Equal Protection Clause.”16  It was the second time that 
the Supreme Court considered Abigail Fisher’s challenge to the Univer-
sity of Texas’ admissions program.  In its first consideration of the case, 
the Court reviewed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that the 
University’s program was constitutional because it was based on a “ho-
listic, multi-factor approach, in which race is but one of many consider-
ations.”17  The Court vacated the appellate court’s decision, not because 
the University considered the race of each applicant in its admissions 
process, but because the lower court “had applied an overly deferential 
16. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
17. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and re-
manded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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‘good-faith’ standard in assessing the constitutionality of the Univer-
sity’s program.”18  The Fisher I Court remanded the case, warning that 
“[r]ace may not be considered unless the admissions process can with-
stand strict scrutiny.”19  Explaining the demands of strict scrutiny, the 
Fisher I Court called on the lower court to engage in a “meaningful” re-
view of the University’s race-conscious plan.20
“In order for judicial review to be meaningful,” Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Court, “a university must make a showing that its plan is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the only interest that this Court has ap-
proved in this context: the benefits of a student body diversity that en-
compasses a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”21  Thus, 
the Court instructed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to examine the 
University of Texas’ admissions program “to ensure that the means cho-
sen to accomplish the [University’s] asserted purpose must be specifi-
cally and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”22  Section (A) 
below reviews the case law in which the Court defined a university’s 
goal of achieving diversity in higher education as a compelling state in-
terest, and Section (B) examines the Court’s definition of strict scrutiny 
and the requirement that a race-conscious plan be “specifically and nar-
rowly framed” to accomplish that goal.23
A. Student Body Diversity is a Compelling Interest that Justifies the Use of 
Race in University Admissions Programs 
The Supreme Court identified the one compelling interest that could 
justify the consideration of race almost four decades ago in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke.24  In that case, Allan Bakke, a white male, 
18. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. 
19. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013). 
20. Id. at 2421. See Zisk, supra note * at 1 (examining the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fisher I and the precedent on which the Court relied). 
21. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
315 (1978) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
22. Id. at 2420 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted). 
23. Id.
24. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.  Justice Powell wrote the opinion and Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in the portion of the judgment that inval-
idated the Medical School’s admissions program that reserved seats for minority applicants, 
and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the part of the judgment 
that reversed the lower court’s invalidation of the Medical School’s consideration of race.  Id.
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challenged the University of California Medical School’s admissions 
program under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because the program operated two separate admissions systems, 
one for white candidates and one for minority candidates, under which 
minority candidates were accepted with lower grade point averages and 
other scores, and 16 seats out of an entering class size of 100 were re-
served for minorities.25  Mr. Bakke was rejected twice in two consecutive 
years in which “applicants were admitted under the special program 
with grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores signif-
icantly lower than Bakke’s.”26
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Powell outlined “certain 
basic premises” relevant to the use of race in university admissions.27
As noted by the Court in Fisher I, Justice Powell’s opinion rested on the 
basic tenets that “decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties 
and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Four-
teenth Amendment”28 and that the “principle of equal protection admits 
no artificial line of a two-class theory that permits the recognition of spe-
cial wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded 
others.”29  It followed, therefore, that “[a]ny racial classification must 
meet strict scrutiny, for when government decisions touch upon an in-
dividual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial deter-
mination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”30
Justice Powell then evaluated the four possible justifications for con-
sideration of race given by the University of California’s Medical School, 
which included: “(i) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfa-
vored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession; (ii) 
countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the num-
ber of physicians who will practice in communities currently under-
served; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an 
ethnically diverse student body.”31  After a thorough analysis of the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection, Justice Powell rejected the first 
at 271–72. 
25. Id. at 273–75. 
26. Id. at 277. 
27. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013). 
28. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287). 
29. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
30. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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three and concluded that only the goal of attaining “a diverse student 
body” can justify the use of race in an admissions program.32  That goal, 
according to Justice Powell, “is a constitutionally permissible goal for 
an institution of higher education” and one that promotes the “atmos-
phere of speculation, experiment and creation—so essential to the qual-
ity of higher education.”33
Since Bakke, the Court has not wavered from the notion that “the in-
terest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admis-
sions program.”34  In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the con-
stitutionality of a race-based admissions program at the University of 
Michigan Law School, the Supreme Court endorsed this view “that stu-
dent body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use 
of race in university admissions.”35  In 2007, in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court again acknowl-
edged that diversity in higher education has been recognized by the 
Court as a compelling state interest and that race may be a component 
in an admissions program when it is “part of a broader assessment of 
diversity.”36
The Court in both Fisher I and Fisher II again endorsed this principle, 
affirming that “a university may institute a race-conscious admissions 
program as a means of obtaining the educational benefits that flow from 
student body diversity.”37  The Court in Fisher II reiterated what the 
Grutter Court held, that “enrolling a diverse student body promotes 
cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 
enables students to better understand persons of different races” and, 
“[e]qually important” that “student body diversity promotes learning 
32. Id. at 311.  As noted by the Court in Fisher I, Justice Powell concluded that “[r]edress-
ing past discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest, because a university’s broad 
mission of education is incompatible with making the “judicial, legislative, or administrative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violations necessary to justify remedial racial classifi-
cation. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (2013) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09 (1978)). 
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
34. Id. at 314. 
35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
36. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (cit-
ing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (2003)) (striking down admissions programs at a primary and 
secondary school because “race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve expo-
sure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints; race, for some students, is 
determinative standing alone”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
37. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (quoting Fisher
I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society.”38  To use race as a factor to achieve this diver-
sity, a university must satisfy the “most rigid scrutiny” of a reviewing 
court, which is discussed in the following section.39
B. A Race-Conscious Admissions Program that is Narrowly Tailored to 
Achieve Student Body Diversity Withstands Strict Scrutiny 
In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy stated that “[r]ace may not be considered 
by a university unless the admissions process can withstand strict scru-
tiny.”40  Describing strict scrutiny as “a searching examination,”41 Justice 
Kennedy explained that to withstand such scrutiny, a university “bears 
the burden to prove that the reasons for any racial classification are 
clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate”42 and that its plan is 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve student body diversity.43  As Justice Ken-
nedy explained in Fisher I and repeated in Fisher II, “[s]trict scrutiny re-
quires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its purpose or in-
terest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its 
use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its pur-
pose.”44
Since Bakke, it has been clear that a university may not “impose a 
fixed quota or otherwise define diversity as some specified percentage 
of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”45  As 
Justice Powell observed: “Preferring members of any one group for no 
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.  
This the Constitution forbids.”46  Twenty-five years after Bakke, the 
Court, in Grutter v. Bollinger, defined what a university may do by de-
fining “the contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-
38. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330) (internal quotation marks 
and alteration omitted). 
39. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (2013) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). 
40. Id. at 2418. 
41. Id. at 2419. 
42. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
43. Id. at 2421. 
44. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Fisher
I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (internal quotation marks and alternation omitted)). 
45. Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
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conscious university admissions programs.”47  As the Grutter Court ex-
plained: “To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program 
cannot use a quota system—it cannot “insulat[e] each category of appli-
cants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other 
applicants.”48  Rather, narrow tailoring requires a race-conscious admis-
sions program to be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements 
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each appli-
cant . . . .”49  The hallmark of narrow tailoring, according to the Court in 
Grutter, as defined first by Justice Powell in Bakke, is “individualized 
consideration of each and every applicant.”50  The importance of “this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admis-
sions program is paramount.”51
Accordingly, the Court ruling in both Fisher I and again in Fisher II
rested on the premise that a university cannot impose a fixed quota or 
otherwise “define diversity as some specified percentage of a particular 
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”52  To ensure that the 
University of Texas’ admissions program was not a quota system, the 
Fisher I Court instructed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to examine 
the University’s admissions program “to determine that the admissions 
processes ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and 
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining fea-
ture of his or her application.”53  The reviewing court must also “verify 
that it is necessary for a university to use race to achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity”54 and to do this, the court must decide “whether a 
university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classi-
fications.”55  If “a nonracial approach could promote the substantial in-
terest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the 
47. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
48. Id. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). 
49. Id. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). 
50. Id.  Relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, the court in Grutter noted that “Pub-
lic and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs 
on Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies.”  Id. at 323. 
51. Id. at 337. 
52. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
53. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
54. Id. at 2420 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. Id.
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university may not consider race.”56  The Court made clear that “strict 
scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrat-
ing, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-
neutral alternatives do not suffice.”57
To carry this burden, the Court explained, a university may prove 
that “a nonracial approach would not promote its interest in the educa-
tional benefits of diversity about as well and at tolerable administrative 
expense.”58  Relying on the Court’s direction in Grutter, the Fisher I Court 
made clear that to carry its burden of narrow tailoring, a university does 
not have to exhaust “every conceivable race-neutral alternative” or 
“choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence [and] fulfilling 
a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all 
racial groups.”59
Applying these principles to the Fisher case, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals on remand from Fisher I reviewed the University’s admis-
sions program and found “force in the argument that race here is a nec-
essary part, albeit one of many parts, of the decisional matrix.”60  After 
a thorough review of all of the steps the University took to increase di-
versity without considering race, discussed in the following section, the 
Court of Appeals was persuaded by the evidence that the University’s 
admissions review was a “holistic process” in which race was a single 
but “necessary” part because there were no race-neutral “workable al-
ternatives.”61  Accordingly, the court upheld the University’s race-con-
scious admissions program, which the Supreme Court affirmed.62
III. SATISFYING THE COURT’S STRICT SCRUTINY
Over the course of several years, the University of Texas tried a va-
riety of approaches to achieve diversity on its campuses.63  The history 
of the University’s admissions practices provided the lower courts and 
56. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) (internal cita-
tions and alterations omitted). 
57. Id.
58. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Fisher
I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
59. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). 
60. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016).
61. Id.
62. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215. 
63. Id. at 2205. 
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subsequently the Supreme Court with data that allowed each court to 
understand the University’s “purpose or interest” in relying on race as 
a factor in its admissions program and then to determine whether that 
use of race “is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose.”64  Re-
viewing the University’s admissions program as it existed when Abigail 
Fisher filed suit, the Court noted that it was “a complex system” that 
had undergone “significant evolution over the past two decades.”65  The 
University’s goal of achieving student body diversity defined the Uni-
versity’s admissions program as it existed when Ms. Fisher filed suit 
and also in its various forms prior to that.66
For the University to satisfy the constitutionally required “searching
examination,”67 the Fisher II Court made clear that “asserting an interest 
in the educational benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient.”68  Ra-
ther, a university’s goals “must be sufficiently measurable to permit ju-
dicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them” and the Court con-
cluded that the University of Texas set forth “concrete and precise 
goals” when it adopted its challenged race-conscious plan.69  Specifi-
cally, the Court noted each of the “educational values” the University 
sought to achieve through its admissions program, including the “pro-
motion of cross-racial understanding, the preparation of a student body 
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and the cultivation of 
a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”70  In addi-
tion, the Court noted the University’s goal to provide an “academic en-
vironment” that offers a “robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differ-
ing cultures, preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse 
workforce, and acquisition of competencies required of future lead-
ers.”71  Based on its review of the record, the Court concluded that “[a]ll 
of these objectives, as a general matter, mirror the ‘compelling interest’ 
this Court has approved in its prior cases.”72
64. Id. at 2208 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 
(2013)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
65. Id. at 2205. 
66. Id. at 2210–11. 
67. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
68. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
69. Id.
70. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations to the trial court record omitted). 
71. Id. (internal citations to the trial court record omitted). 
72. Id.
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Convinced that the University provided a “reasoned, principled ex-
planation for its decision to pursue these goals,”73 the Court then con-
sidered whether the University’s plan was narrowly tailored to achieve 
student body diversity, consistent with the directive of Fisher I.74  As 
Justice Kennedy noted in Fisher II, narrow tailoring imposes on a uni-
versity a “heavy burden” to show “that it had not obtained the educa-
tion benefits of diversity before it turned to a race-conscious plan.”75  To 
carry its burden, the University relied on decades of data and “months 
of study and deliberation, including retreats, interviews, and review of 
data,” to conclude that “the use of race-neutral policies and programs 
had not been successful in achieving sufficient racial diversity at the 
University.”76
To decide that the University’s conclusion “could not be faulted on 
this score,”77 the Court reviewed the various admissions programs the 
University utilized over many years and the enrollment data that these 
programs generated.  To begin with, the Court noted that prior to 1996, 
the University considered an applicant’s SAT scores, high school aca-
demic performance, and race and gave preference to minorities.78  Then, 
in 1996, the University was forced to remove the consideration of race 
from its admissions review because the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that “any consideration of race in col-
lege admissions” violates the Equal Protection Clause.79  Following the 
Hopwood decision, the University began making admissions decisions 
based on an “applicant’s essays, leadership and work experience, extra-
curricular activities, community service, and other ‘special characteris-
tics’ that might give the admissions committee insight into a student’s 
background.”80  The “special circumstances” to which the Court re-
ferred included “growing up in a single-parent home, speaking a lan-
73. Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
74. Id.; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (noting that narrow tailoring “requires that the review-
ing court to verify that it is ‘necessary’ for the university to use race to achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity”) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)). 
75. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211. 
76. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations to the trial record omitted). 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2205. 
79. Id. (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932, 934–35, 948 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
80. Id.
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guage other than English at home, significant family responsibilities as-
sumed by the applicant, and the general socioeconomic condition of the 
student’s family.”81 Consistent with Hopwood, the University did not 
consider an applicant’s race at any point during the admissions deci-
sion.82
To compensate for its inability to consider race in the admissions 
process, the University tried a variety of ways to increase minority en-
rollment and “created targeted scholarship programs to increase its 
yield among minority students, expanded the quality and quantity of 
its outreach efforts to high schools in underrepresented areas of the 
state, and focused additional attention and resources on recruitment in 
low-performing schools.”83  It also examined factors including “the so-
cio-economic status of the student’s family, languages other than Eng-
lish spoken at home, and whether the student lives in a single-parent 
household.”84  Even using these tools, however, minority enrollment 
“decreased immediately.”85
Responding to this decrease, the Texas Legislature enacted the Top 
Ten Percent Law that guaranteed high school seniors in the top ten per-
cent of their class admission into any public state university in Texas.86
According to its legislative history, the law was intended to “ensure a 
highly qualified pool of students each year in the state’s higher educa-
tional system” while promoting diversity among the applicant pool so 
“that a large well qualified pool of minority students [is] admitted to 
Texas universities.”87  Pursuant to this law, beginning in 1998, the Uni-
versity was obligated to fill up to seventy-five percent of its freshman 
81. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
82. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
83. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F. 3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and re-
manded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
84. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591–92 (W.D. Tex. 2009), 
aff’d, 631 F. 3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
85. Fisher, 631 F. 3d at 223 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(noting that “the publicity from the [Hopwood] case impacted the number of admitted minor-
ities who chose to enroll.”). 
86. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F. 3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (West 
2012) and noting that admission is guaranteed for “all public high school seniors in the top 
ten percent of their class at the time of their application, as well as the top ten percent of high 
school seniors attending private schools that make their student rankings available to uni-
versity admissions officers”). 
87. Id. (quoting House Higher Educ. Comm., House Research Organization Digest, Tex. 
C.S.H.B. 588, 75th Leg. R.S. 4–5 (Apr. 15, 1997)). 
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class with students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high 
school class,88 and relied on a race-neutral holistic review of other appli-
cants to fill the remaining twenty-five percent of the class.89
Despite the fact that she did not qualify for admission under the Top 
Ten Percent plan, Fisher argued that the plan offered a race-neutral al-
ternative to the University’s race-conscious plan, making the race-con-
scious plan unnecessary and constitutionally unacceptable.90  The Uni-
versity produced extensive evidence and proved that the percentage 
plan did not, however, achieve the University’s goal of student body 
diversity.91  To the contrary, the evidence, which the court labeled “sig-
nificant evidence, both statistical and anecdotal,”92 showed “consistent 
stagnation in terms of the percentage of minority students enrolling” 
during the time the University could not consider race as part of its ho-
listic review of applicants.93  The Court also noted that the University’s 
evidence showed that minority students admitted during this time pe-
riod experienced “feelings of loneliness and isolation” because of low 
enrollment across a wide variety of classes.94  As observed by the Court 
of Appeals, although the Top Ten Percent plan “may have contributed 
to an increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students 
remain clustered in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of 
educational diversity.”95
Additionally, as the Supreme Court noted, the plan is actually not 
race-neutral and it sacrifices the holistic approach to admissions deci-
sions that captures a wide variety of students with different back-
grounds, cultures, and experience.96  Quoting from Justice Ginsburg’s 
88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (explaining 
that the “Texas law caps the number of places in the freshman class that may be filled through 
this program to seventy-five percent of the total class, which has the effect of guaranteeing 
admission only to students who graduate in the top seven or eight percent of their high school 
classes”)
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2211. 
91. Id. at 2212 (noting that at the time of Fisher’s application, “none of her proposed 





95. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F. 3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and re-
manded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (internal citation omitted). 
96. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213–14. 
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dissent in Fisher I, Justice Kennedy noted in Fisher II that the law, though 
facially neutral, was, in fact, “adopted with racially segregated neigh-
borhoods and schools front and center stage.”97  Again quoting Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy explicitly stated: “It is race consciousness, 
not blindness to race, that drives such plans.”98  Accordingly, the Court 
rejected Fisher’s assertion that the Top Ten Percent plan offered a race-
neutral alternative to the University’s race-conscious admissions pro-
gram.99
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy noted, using class rank alone to deter-
mine who attends the University presented a bigger problem than 
whether or not the Top Ten Percent plan was race-neutral because using 
only class rank “would sacrifice all other aspects of diversity in pursuit 
of enrolling a higher number of minority students.”100  Antithetical to 
the purposes of a holistic approach that considers many facets of an ap-
plicant, the Top Ten Percent plan 
would exclude the star athlete or musician whose grades 
suffered because of daily practices and training. It would 
exclude a talented young biologist who struggled to 
maintain above-average grades in humanities classes. 
And it would exclude a student whose freshman-year 
grades were poor because of a family crisis but who got 
herself back on track in her last three years of school, only 
to find herself just outside of the top decile of her class.101
Apparently responding to the dissenting Justices’ opinion in Fisher
II that “the Top Ten Percent Plan admits the wrong kind of African–
American and Hispanic students,”102 Justice Kennedy noted that admit-
ting students using “any single metric” like class rank, “will capture cer-
tain types of people and miss others” and “[t]his does not imply that 
students admitted through holistic review are necessarily more capable 
or more desirable than those admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
97. Id. at 2213 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 
(2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
98. Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct., at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Fisher, 631 
F.3d at 224 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (noting that that the law 
was touted as a “race-neutral” initiative because it “did not by its terms admit students on 
the basis of race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admis-
sion a large, if not primary, purpose”).
99. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213. 
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2216 (Alito, Thomas, JJs., and Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Plan.”103  Rather, it “merely reflects the fact that privileging one charac-
teristic above all others does not lead to a diverse student body.”104  The 
Grutter Court had previously recognized this weakness in the percent-
age plans in place in Florida, California, and Texas, observing that they 
“may preclude the university from conducting the individualized as-
sessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just racially 
diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university.”105
Consistent with the Grutter Court’s concern, the Fisher II Court con-
cluded not only that Texas’ Top Ten Percent plan does not offer a viable 
alternative to a race-conscious admissions program but also that it “is a 
blunt instrument that may well compromise the University’s own defi-
nition of the diversity it seeks.”106
Another argument Fisher made against using a race-conscious plan 
was that “the University could intensify its outreach efforts to African-
American and Hispanic applicants.”107  Rejecting this argument, the 
Court noted that “the University submitted extensive evidence of the 
many ways in which it already had intensified its outreach efforts to 
those students.”108  For example, the University “created three new 
scholarship programs, opened new regional admissions centers, in-
creased its recruitment budget by half-a-million dollars, and organized 
over 1,000 recruitment events.”109  “Perhaps more significantly,” accord-
ing to the Court, the University spent seven years under Hopwood’s di-
rective “attempting to achieve its compelling interest using race-neutral 
holistic review” and “none of these efforts succeeded.”110
The Court also dismissed Fisher’s suggestion that the University 
could have altered “the weight given to academic and socioeconomic 
factors in the University’s admissions calculus” because that proposal 
ignored “the fact that the University tried, and failed, to increase diver-
sity through enhanced consideration of socioeconomic and other fac-
tors.”111  Moreover, according to the Court, the proposal ignored “this 
Court’s precedent making clear that the Equal Protection Clause does 
103. Id. at 2213. 
104. Id.
105. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003). 
106. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
107. Id. at 2212–13. 
108. Id. at 2213. 
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not force universities to choose between a diverse student body and a 
reputation for academic excellence.”112  As the Court stated in Grutter 
and repeated in Fisher II, “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaus-
tion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative” or “require a univer-
sity to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence [and] ful-
filling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members 
of all racial groups.”113  Instead, “it does impose on the university the 
ultimate burden of demonstrating” that “race-neutral alternatives that 
are both available and workable do not suffice.”114  Based on its review 
of the data generated by the University’s varied attempts to achieve stu-
dent body diversity, the Court concluded that at the time Fisher applied, 
“none of her proposed alternatives was a workable means for the Uni-
versity to attain the benefits of diversity it sought.”115
Having come to the conclusion, after “months of study and deliber-
ation,”116 that its race-neutral efforts were not working to achieve stu-
dent body diversity, and after the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a holistic race-conscious plan in Grutter v. Bollinger,117 the 
University proposed to the Board of Regents that it be allowed to begin 
taking race into consideration as one of “the many ways in which [an] 
academically qualified individual might contribute to, and benefit from, 
the rich, diverse, and challenging educational environment of the Uni-
versity.”118  With approval from the Board, the University adopted the 
admissions policy that included the consideration of race.119
Under this plan, and consistent with Grutter, race was “given weight 
as a subfactor” within a much broader list of factors.120  For the seats that 
were not filled with students admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan, 
the University assigned one score based “an applicant’s SAT score and 
academic performance in high school”121 and another score based on 
112. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). 
113. Id. at 2208 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339) (alteration in original). 
114. Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 4211, 2420 (2013)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
115. Id. at 2212. 
116. Id. at 2211. 
117. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 




121. Id. at 2205. 
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“an applicant’s essays, letters of recommendation, resumes, writing 
samples, artwork,” and other things an applicant may submit and “eval-
uates the applicant’s potential contributions to the University’s student 
body based on the applicant’s leadership experience, extracurricular ac-
tivities, awards/honors, community service, and other ‘special circum-
stances.’”122  These “special circumstances” include such things as “the 
socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, the socioeconomic status 
of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s family responsibilities, whether 
the applicant lives in a single-parent home, the applicant’s SAT score in 
relation to the average SAT score at the applicant’s school, the language 
spoken at the applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s race.”123
Based on its review of this evidence and acknowledging that race 
“can make a difference to whether an application is accepted or re-
jected,” the Court took note that the University’s plan did not impose a 
quota or otherwise “define diversity as some specified percentage of a 
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”124  Rather, 
according to the Court, “there is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of a 
factor of a factor’ in the holistic-review calculus.”125  Finding no obstacle 
to the plan on this point, the Court went on to consider whether other 
admissions policies would have accomplished the University’s goal of 
student body diversity without considering race.126
Reviewing the demographic statistics, anecdotes, and the “more nu-
anced quantitative data,” the Court concluded that the University’s as-
sessment of its need for “race-conscious review” had been done “with 
care” and “a reasonable determination was made that the University 
had not yet attained its goals.”127  In response to Fisher’s argument that 
the University’s did not have to consider race because “such considera-
tion has had only a minimal impact in advancing the University’s com-
pelling interest,” the Court made clear that “it is not a failure of narrow 
tailoring for the impact of racial consideration to be minor.”128  To the 
contrary, the fact that “race consciousness played a role in only a small 
122. Id. at 2205–06. 
123. Id. (internal citations to the trial record omitted). 
124. Id. at 2207–08 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 
2419 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125. Id. at 2207 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. 
Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F. 3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)). 
126. Id. at 2211–12. 
127. Id. at 2212. 
128. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
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portion of admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailor-
ing, not evidence of unconstitutionality.”129
Having carefully reviewed all of Fisher’s suggested alternatives, the 
Court concluded that “none . . . have been shown to be available and 
workable means through which the University could have met its edu-
cational goals.”130  Accordingly, the Court decided that the University 
“met its burden of showing that the admissions policy it used at the time 
it rejected [Fisher’s] application was narrowly tailored.”131
IV. RACE CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE EMBRACED,
NOT LIMITED, TO ENSURE REVIEW OF ALL OF THE TRAITS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF EVERY APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION
The Court has now endorsed two race-conscious admissions plans, 
in Grutter v. Bollinger and Fisher I and II, and in Fisher II made clear what 
a university must show to defend the use of such a plan.  Repeatedly, 
the Court has endorsed as constitutionally permissible race-conscious 
plans that consider all of an applicant’s attributes, where race is “but a 
factor of a factor of a factor in the holistic-review calculus.”132  Instead 
of embracing this time-tested holistic approach to university admis-
sions, however, Justice Kennedy refers in Fisher II to the University’s 
race-conscious plan as an “affirmative-action program” and proceeds to 
limit the reach of the Court’s holding.133  The limitations he attached are 
reviewed in section (A).  Section (B) raises the question whether any 
limitation is necessary, given that holistic race-conscious admissions 
programs are not “affirmative action” plans that allow for preferential 
treatment but are plans that ensure equal consideration of all of the char-
acteristics and traits of every applicant for admission to a college or uni-
versity class.
A. Justice Kennedy’s Limitations of Fisher II’s Reach 
At the outset of his analysis of the facts of the case, Justice Kennedy 
described the University of Texas’ admissions program as “sui generis”
and drew a distinction between the University’s admission program 
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2214 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133, S. Ct. 2411, 2420 
(2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131. Id. at 2214. 
132. Id. at 2207 (internal quotation marks and citation to lower court decision omitted).
133. Id. at 2208. 
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and “other approaches to college admissions considered by this Court,” 
because Texas’ program “combines holistic review with a percentage 
plan.”134  He explicitly stated that the “case has been litigated on a some-
what artificial basis” because Fisher had not challenged the percentage 
plan, which “may limit its value for prospective guidance.”135 Fisher’s 
failure to challenge the percentage plan, however, left the Court with 
only the issue of whether the University’s race-conscious program vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.136  Justice Kennedy lamented that 
Fisher’s failure to challenge the percentage plan “led to a record that is 
almost devoid of information about the students who secured admis-
sion to the University through the Plan.”137  This void in the record 
meant that the Court, according to Justice Kennedy, could not “know 
how students admitted solely based on their class rank differ in their 
contribution to diversity from students admitted through holistic re-
view.”138  Justice Kennedy’s concern for this lack of evidence appears to 
be inconsistent with the Court’s close scrutiny of the evidence the Uni-
versity produced, which Justice Kennedy noted was “significant evi-
dence, both statistical and anecdotal” and its conclusion that the Uni-
versity’s review of enrollment “appears to have been done with care,” 
and that “a reasonable determination was made that the University had 
not yet attained its goals.”139
Justice Kennedy also noted that the University had no choice but to 
work within the confines of the Top Ten Percent law and that the Uni-
versity’s compliance with the law must “refute any criticism that the 
University did not make good-faith efforts to comply with the law.”140
This conclusion appears to support the University’s decision in this case 
and, again leaves the Court with only the issue of whether the Univer-
sity’s race-conscious admissions program could withstand strict scru-
tiny, which the Court concluded it did.141
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2209. 
136. Id. at 2208. 
137. Id. at 2209. 
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2212.  See supra notes 91–95 and 108–15 and accompany text for the discussion 
of the evidence the University produced. 
140. Id. at 2209. 
141. Id. at 2209–10. 
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B. Redefining the Use of Race in University Admissions as Part of a Holistic 
Approach to Understanding Every Applicant and Not as “Affirmative 
Action” to Help The Undeserving at the Expense of the Deserving Applicant 
The Court’s reaffirmation that holistic admissions programs are con-
stitutionally sound should herald a new way of thinking about race-
conscious plans.  Instead of labelling a race-conscious plan an “affirma-
tive action” plan, as Justice Kennedy did in Fisher II,142 such a plan 
should be defined, as the Court defined the University of Texas and the 
University of Michigan’s Law School plans—as an “individualized con-
sideration of each and every applicant.”143  The phrase “affirmative ac-
tion” carries with it the negative connotation suggesting that consider-
ation of race allows for the admission of less qualified minority 
applicants, which Justice Thomas stated explicitly in his dissent in Fisher
I.144  Justice Thomas has also stated in his dissents in Fisher I and Fisher
II that considering race in a university admissions program “demeans 
us all.”145  Properly understood, however, when consistent with the 
Court’s definition of a constitutionally acceptable holistic approach, 
race-conscious plans do not allow for favorable treatment of any one 
applicant but instead ensure equal treatment of all applicants based on 
all of their personal characteristics and traits.146
Indeed, labelling race-conscious plans as “affirmative-action” plans 
is misleading because race cannot be used to “aid” anyone at the ex-
pense of another.147  Instead, as recognized by the Court of Appeals in 
its second consideration of Fisher’s challenge, diversity “is a composite 
142. Id. at 2208 (reviewing the principles set forth by the Court in Fisher I).
143. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); accord Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin 
(Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
144. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “Blacks and Hispan-
ics admitted to the University as a result of racial discrimination are, on average, far less 
prepared than their white and Asian classmates”).
145. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 
2422 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
146. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“Preferring members 
of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own 
sake. This the Constitution forbids.”).  See also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (noting that a uni-
versity cannot impose a fixed quota or otherwise “define diversity as ‘some specified per-
centage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin’”) (quoting Fisher I,
133 S. Ct. at 2419); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admis-
sions program cannot use a quota system—it cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants 
with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.’”) (quoting 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
147. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
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of the backgrounds, experiences, achievements, and hardships of stu-
dents to which race only contributes.”148  This type of review does not 
give preferential treatment to any applicant, but instead ensures “the in-
dividualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is 
not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the 
university.”149  Based on this now well-established principle, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the University’s race-conscious 
plan and recognized that to do otherwise would “confound developing 
principles of neutral affirmative action.”150  Thus, as the Fifth Circuit 
modified the phrase, “affirmative action” plans may be properly under-
stood as plans to ensure “individualized” treatment of each and every 
applicant but not special treatment of any.151
Starting with Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that a university may not consider race alone to give 
preferential treatment to anyone but may be able to include race in its 
consideration of applicants, together with “exceptional personal talents, 
unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, 
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, abil-
ity to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed im-
portant.”152  Reinforcing Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke, the Fisher II
Court noted the importance of using every characteristic of an applicant 
and not just one, warning that relying on any “single metric . . . will 
capture certain types of people and miss others.”153  As Justice Kennedy 
observed, the Top Ten Percent plan might exclude “the star athlete or 
musician,” or the “talented young biologist who struggled to maintain 
above-average grades in humanities classes.”154
Thus, a university must consider all characteristics of an applicant 
and, as Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, any of them, including race, 
148. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016). 
149. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340; see also Fisher, 758 F.3d at 646 (noting that “Grutter blessed 
an admissions program, applied to the entire pool of students competing for admission, 
which considers race as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that 
is diverse in ways broader than race”) (internal quotations marks omitted).
150. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 660 (emphasis added). 
151. Id. at 646. 
152. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
153. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2213 (2016). 
154. Id.  See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text for a discussion of the weak-
nesses of percentage plans. 
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“may tip the balance in his favor,” but that impact would be no different 
than how the “geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the 
balance in other candidates’ cases.”155  Justice Powell illustrated this by 
describing how the “file of a particular black applicant may be examined 
for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race be-
ing decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant 
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qual-
ities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.”156  The 
Grutter Court agreed, warning that using only one characteristic like 
class rank as part of a percentage plan “may preclude the university 
from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble 
a student body that is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the 
qualities valued by the university.”157
Considering race completes a university’s understanding of each ap-
plicant and should not be confused with “a classification that aids per-
sons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the ex-
pense of other innocent individuals,” which the Court has “never 
approved . . . in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”158 Accordingly, as the 
Court has repeated over the span of several years, instead of affirma-
tively helping any applicant, a “holistic, multi-factor approach, in which 
race is but one of many considerations,”159 will be “flexible enough to 
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for 
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same 
weight.”160
V. CONCLUSION
Including race in a consideration of characteristics for each applicant 
allows universities to assess each candidate as an individual and to 
build a class that is diverse in many ways.  Embracing the University of 
Texas’ race-conscious admissions program as “central” to its “identity 
155. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. 
156. Id. at 317. 
157. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003). 
158. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). 
159. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and re-
manded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added); accord Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
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and educational mission,” the Court in Fisher II has confirmed that uni-
versities may include race in a holistic consideration of  the potential of 
all applicantsal to contribute to their schools.161  Calling on universities 
to “scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether 
changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious 
policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the af-
firmative-action measures it deems necessary,” the Court properly in-
vites all universities to ensure the continuing integrity of their admis-
sions programs.162  Labelling race-conscious plans as “affirmative-
action” plans, however, is misleading because race cannot be used to 
aid anyone at the expense of another.163  Moving forward, therefore, uni-
versities may embrace race-conscious plans, not because they help some 
students who are unqualified or less qualified than their peers, but be-
cause they consider all of the characteristics of all of their applicants and 
ensure student body diversity, as the Court has now repeatedly con-
firmed they can do.
161. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016). 
162. Id. at 2214–15 (noting that it “is the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in 
constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies”). 
163. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
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